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By mid 1990s the democratic flow of the early years ebbed, and old habits proved hard to die in Russia. In the second part of the decade the basic feature of the new system crystallized. The ruling elite, after seizing control of the oil export and other assets, preferred to spend proceeds in the comfortable West instead of wrestling with hard challenges at home. The less lucky compatriots were left in custody of unreformed bureaucracy and security apparatus. No wonder, in the next decade under Putin, former KGB lieutenant colonel whom Yeltsin appointed the successor, traditional style authoritarian regime consolidated its grip on Russia.

Like Yeltsin and most of other predecessors on the Russian throne, Putin started his tenure with an idea of catching up with the West by attempting at least some urgent and long overdue reforms. Yet, he also found that the endeavor was easier named then done, and most importantly could’ve undermined the system that provided him with unchallenged power. Reforms able to unlock development, especially in modern economy, must have a general thrust towards liberalization and competitiveness. The corrupt elite with traditionally strong security and military components learned the lesson of late 1980 - early 1990s.

In search for strengthening the system by modernizing the ailing economy the then soviet leader Gorbachev soon had hit the barrier of the suffocating "monopolism" of bureaucracy (later joined by crony oligarchs). He tried to overcome, first by command, second by liberalization. Yet, European oriented society pushed liberalization into political field aspiring to emulate the western patterns of free market and democracy. As Gorbachev refused to use force to rein in that push, the system crumbled from periphery to the center. In Eastern Europe the Berlin Wall fell and former Soviet satellites one after another got rid of KGB control, chose the European model and decided to join EU and NATO. In 1991 the KGB headquarters in Moscow were under siege and the Soviet Union ceased to exist. Putin appointed first to lead the successor security service and then the country, was determined not to repeat that reckless experiment.

The inherited inability of the political system to allow sustainable socio-economic modernization was veiled by the rising oil price that provided for the rulers and also for the people. Per capita GDP rose from $ 1,771.6 in 2000 to $14,611.7 in 2013 according to the World Bank.

Nevertheless the Russia European identity made impossible to build a Chinese wall between GDP growth and politics. Impressive rallies rolled over Moscow and some other cities in protest of ragged elections in 2012. In response the regime strengthened police control and elevated traditional anti western propaganda to the level of state ideology guiding domestic and foreign policy. And it was not just a tactical maneuver. Let there be no mistake, a dream of some day "living like other people", i.e. of emulating the western model, is deep seated in Russian people. That’s why for the autocrats the very existence of the democratic West, above all the US, mounts to real and present danger, and relations with it degrade to a zero sum game. Undermining the opposite camp and supporting anti-western forces close to home or in remote places like Syria and Venezuela, is simply a foreign policy dimension of securing their power in Russia.

For them the "Cold War" never ended. And as long as they are in power will not end. As foreign minister of Russia I met long-term dictator of Syria Hafez Al-Assad who expressed bewilderment at my request to change policy while for decades my predecessors coming from

Moscow praised him as loyal "soldier at the forefront of fight against American imperialism". I guess he exhaled when my successor and his old friend Primakov paid a visit to him. His heir Bashar Al-Assad also has no illusion why he is needed to Moscow. Said he: "Syria and Iran and Russia see eye to eye regarding this conflict," meaning bloodbath he unleashed in his country. "It's not about having a huge interest in Syria. They could have it anywhere else," he told the US public television network. "So, it's about the future of the world." ( http://news.yahoo.com/russia-iran-syria-share-same-vision-assad-024341461.html )

The Cold war mongering can be contained now as it was during soviet period. More over there is potential for carefully defined cooperation in specific areas like nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, prevention of terrorist attacks on each other homeland and curb of narcotic trafficking. Whether it will be done depends on ability of the West, especially of the US, to realize the driving forces of Kremlin’s policy and follow an effective strategy towards Russia.

Some lessons to this effect could be drawn from the Ukraine crisis. It is almost a conventional wisdom to interpret Russian actions there by analyzing intentions of Mr. Putin. Either he wants to restore the empire or just to teach the west a lesson for encouraging

"Euromaidan" that he interpreted as inroad into his sphere of interest. Or simply boost his domestic popularity on the nationalist hysteria. Moscow insists on supporting (a euphemism for fomenting) a rebellion in Eastern Ukraine against pro western government in Kiev.

Stephen Kinzer argues that Putin’s reaction to encirclement isn’t surprising and to extend a rationale for aggression in Ukraine, offers the concept of "strategic depth," or the taking of enough adjacent territory to protect the homeland ( Opinion, March 1). All these explanations are valid. And there is the fundamental ground underlying all of them. Eastern Ukraine is a strategically important battleground of the continuing Cold war aimed at undermining the west and its influence everywhere possible. The hostility to the west and its values is a constant driver of the autocratic system in Russia. It is pursued as far as the resisting forces permit, and that’s why the Ukrainian front turned hot and bloody.

On the flip side Russian rulers have always been expected and dreamed (European identity speaks in them too) to win recognition and a place among leaders of developed countries. That’s why Putin took it to the heart when Obama and many others did not show at the Sochi Olympics in protest to the Kremlin’s anti-western pivot. Yet, the signal was so weak and muted (the preparations for the G-8 meeting in Sochi just two months later went in full speed) that it only incited hardliners.

Unfortunately the pattern of weak responses to Kremlin growing militancy has been followed on. Apparently this kind of reaction was supposed as a measured and incremental methodical encouragement to deescalate while leaving space for face saving negotiations and maneuvers. At least the wording used by western leaders suggested that. President Obama constantly called on Putin to deescalate. The sanctions following annexation of Crimea and initial stages of intervention in Eastern Ukraine were imposed on a very limited number of persons then on more individuals and a couple of rather secondary institutions. Kremlin scornfully shrugged them.

Only after the civilian aircraft with about three hundred international passengers was shot over part of Ukrainian territory seized by Russian proxy fighters, the US and European Union announced some biting measures. Even these are to hurt more in the long run, and accompanied with conciliatory rhetoric and protestations of readiness and indeed desire to lift the sanctions as soon as possible.

De-escalation techniques are suitable in dealing with distressed individuals suffering from dementia or with a post-war syndrome in military veterans. Yet they are hardly productive in relations with a regime in control of large country guided not so much by distressed individuals, but also – and primarily – by its interests, and determined to test and constantly push the limits of its policy contesting the others.

It is now widely recognized that the challengers to the world order are up to a hybrid warfare that combines cyber and information (or rather disinformation) operations going on non-stop, i.e. in normal times, and the use of Special Forces to support subversion in crisis.

And they act resolutely counting on surprise effect. Yet a surprise it should not be. An autocratic regime pursuing anti western propaganda and militarization at home provided enough ground for alert and adequate correction of the defense strategy for other nations.

The reactions of the West were too slow and too weak already at two pivotal turns of history. First when Russia tried to part with its authoritarian and aggressive legacy and join the West. Ironically a protracted transition to post-cold war strategies in western capitals gained momentum and extended long after the situation in Russia turned back to a more traditional model.

Second, when they were taken by surprise by annexation and subversion in Ukraine, it is the third call now – a hybrid version the Cold War. So far, the Western response to has been marked by confusion and bewilderment, sporadic tough talk of red lines, and very cautious moves or no action when those lines were crossed. Empty threats are no better than empty promises. They are misleading and provocative.

The results are opposite to de-escalation. Especially in dealing with Russia where as Julia Ioffe keenly pointed out "if one shows some weakness, then one is all weakness—and therefore prey."* No wonder Western pundits and politicians are again playing the blame game of "Who Lost Russia?"

It’s high time the West treated Russia in robust, straightforward and resolute way both when she opts for good and for bad. That’s the least of what the great country deserves. And that is crucial for preservation of peace and international order.

*Julia Ioffe is a contributing writer at The New York Times Magazine.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2015/03/14/thisis-

why-its-impossible-for-the-kremlin-to-lie-about-putins-weirddisappearance

* http://www.nytimes.com/1992/02/02/world/bush-and-yeltsin-declareformal-

end-to-cold-war-agree-to-exchange-visits.html?pagewanted=2

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