Article 2. What went wrong between NATO and Russia.

The fall of 1991 after the hardline coup attempt was defeated by prodemocracy forces the new Russia substituted the Soviet Union with the movement aspiring on building a European type society. "On this basis of deep reforms and common values," President of Russia Yeltsin rote in the letter addressed to NATO, Russia was eager to develop dialog and contacts with NATO both in political and military fields. "Today we do not ask for Russian membership in NATO, but regard it as our long-term political objective" the letter went on. This statement of the new policy was widely published and publicized in Russian media.

A Russian saying goes that misfortune often leads to fortune. Unfortunately the text of the letter was given to press with a technical mistake. The word "not" was absent. So it read as "Today we do ask for. Russian membership in NATO, but regard it as our long-term objective."

Next day we issued a correction. Fortunately this drew additional attention to the document and its meaning which in essence was the same with or without "not". At that time nobody except the Communists challenged the concept directly. Some doubts were expressed only on ability and good will of NATO to welcome Russia to the club. I knew though that there were many in the bureaucracy who did not like this "pro-Western" approach and would try to strike back.

In early 1990s the rapprochement of Russia with and integration of East European states into western economic institutions was reluctantly accepted even by hardliners in Moscow as inevitable. Yet I knew that they would not "swallow" as easily cooperation with NATO. Different from other institutions it was a military block built pointedly to counter the Soviet Union and for that matter most hated and demonized by communist propaganda. The adversary image of NATO was the last line of defense for old guards in the military-security complex as it guaranteed them a privileged position in the power-structure of the "ceased fortress" whether it was called Soviet Union or Russian Federation.

I was convinced that there was a sound alternative to that attitude if national interests were put before the vested ones. The military and security forces of democratic Russia could and should become partners of their western counterparts in fighting common enemies like rogue states, terrorists, drug-traffickers and so on.

Advocating this I won in December 1993 more than 70% of popular votes in a competitive election for the parliament membership in the region of Murmansk which included the major naval base hosting the core of Russian nuclear armed fleet. This was a rare free and fair election, and the returns reflected the mood of grass root citizens and service men.

Clearly though my solution required radical and resolute reform of the military and security institutions, and in many cases firing or retiring soviet-indoctrinated personnel, particularly of high age and rank. Yet President Yeltsin chose exactly a veteran Evgeny Primakov for the chief of foreign intelligence service and felt comfortable keeping personally loyal but hardly democracy zealous heads of other relevant bodies. He argued that the reform was a tough and multifaceted process that should be carefully controlled to maintain stability on the way. That was true, but in my view testified for urgency of a robust action.

Bearing in mind complexity of the issue we had a confidential understanding on avoidance of ruff moves with Warren Christopher, the Secretary of State in the new Democratic administration. More or less similar kind of discussions and understandings I had with some Eastern European leaders who recognized that their desire to join NATO should be realized in stages and in consonance with Moscow.

Lech Walesa, the President of Poland, was not on the patience list. Upon arrival of the Russian President to Warsaw in a hot August day of 1993 Walesa invited him to a private dinner with no note-takers. After midnight I was awakened up by a call from Yeltsin. When I walked in his suite, he could hardly utter an apology for the late call and handled a piece of paper with a ragged handwriting and his signature. It was an insertion in the declaration prepared for signature ceremony next morning with endorsement of Poland’s desire to join NATO as soon as possible. In my heart I welcomed it. In my mind though was no doubt that the statement would wake up sleeping dogs without any practical purpose. Like all East European nations Poland could not be ready for NATO earlier then in 3-4 years. Also Russia had to work out its membership or a special treaty with the alliance. Early next dawn the defense minister Grachev and I asked Yeltsin to have a more sober look at the matter. After that a compromise formulation was agreed with the Poles – Russia recognized the right of Poland to join NATO.

The incident, including the "late night" formulation, leaked to press. I had to apologize to my American and other partners who were caught by surprise. Most importantly we all lost ability to calmly address the matter without politicized domestic and international pressures.

The task of bridging the gap between Russia and NATO became burning. Nevertheless, Washington was in no hurry to negotiate a pivotal political deal.

The military contacts were sluggish too. Yet the official visit of Russian defense minister Grachev to Washington in early fall went well. As I expected Grachev was impressed by quality of the US military and their status in society. He also seemed more receptive to the idea of Russian armed forces becoming allies of the best armies of the world. Grachev reported to Yeltsin that the Pentagon chief Bill Perry preferred developing military contacts, joint planning, exercises and peacekeeping missions to enlargement.

Soon after, that the Secretary of State Warren Christopher came to Moscow as

"Personal envoy" of the US president to brief his Russian friend on the new NATO policy. The meeting is vividly described in Strobe Talbot Memoir of Presidential Diplomacy. "Chris laid out our decision on NATO: we would not proceed immediately with enlargement but concentrate instead on developing the "Partnership for Peace"…

Without letting Chris finish, Yeltsin spread his arms and intoned, drawing out the words, "Genialno. Zdorovo." (Brilliant. Terrific). "Tell Bill this is a wonderful decision." …After a brief review of other issues, Kozyrev and Yeltsin’s other aids virtually booted us out the door." In his memoir "Chances of a Lifetime" Warren Christopher recalled "My first reaction [to Yeltsin’s cheerful interruption] was that it just couldn’t be this easy…Had Kozyrev, Russia’s foreign minister, deliberately failed to alert Yeltsin to the full scope of Clinton’s decision, or was Yeltsin simply relieved that NATO’s expansion would not be immediate?" I also was puzzled - and worried - why the envoy did not finish the presentation after the interruption and instead drifted to other issues. Logically Yeltsin preferred to brush away interpretations of Clinton’s policy and stuck to what he heard directly from his top representative. Thus he felt offended and betrayed when in early February his friend Bill made public statement in Prague that the PFP "sets in motion a process that leads to the enlargement of NATO." .

The hard-liners were winning the day in Moscow. Primakov made public a report of the intelligence service that implied that NATO was still a threat to Russia and thus Kozyrev’s formula "No hasty enlargement. Yes partnership." should be replaced with: "no enlargement." Of course, this only incited the Easter European states to seek membership in NATO, but the prize was in Russia. NATO attitude

was seen in the Kremlin and in the bulk of the media as deceptive and its expansion without Russia menacing. Yeltsin signed a program of modernization of

Russian strategic nuclear forces.

The historic opportunity for Russia to become a NATO ally instead of foe closed in Moscow as Washington failed to seize it. This US reaction was in sharp contrast with the resolute response to the emergence of the Russian enemy at the beginning of the Cold war. One year after the famous Churchill "Iron Curtain" speech in

March 1946 the Truman doctrine was announced backed by $400 million aid to Turkey and Greece, and two years later NATO was established. Four years after collapse of the USSR, NATO was offering Russia a 5 page document on PFP that could be gradually implemented in future.

In summer of 1995 Yeltsin authorized me to sign to the offer. In exchange he got a promise of no major steps towards NATO expansion in 1996, the year of presidential elections in Russia. Thus it was a mutual understanding that he will run under anti-NATO banners. In the beginning of 1996 Primakov succeeded me . (later became the prime minister) and Grachev was changed to even more traditionalist general from soviet nuclear command.

In 1997 the "Founding Act" between NATO and the Russia was added to the PFP agreement that had being implemented as halfheartedly as signed. Yeltsin, in his radio address to the Russian people on May 30, described the Act as an effort "to minimize the negative consequences of NATO's expansion and prevent a new split in Europe." He then described the agreement—inaccurately, according to Western officials—as "enshrining NATO's pledge not to deploy nuclear weapons on the territories of its new member countries and not [to] build up its armed forces near our borders...nor carry out relevant infrastructure preparations." ( https://www.armscontrol.org/act/1997_05/jm ) Instead of alliance NATO and Russia returned to controlled hostility. There was no Churchill or Truman in that crucial time. And the time was lost.

Part III To be continued

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