In a territory of a hundred square li, a tenth should be occupied by mountains and hills, a tenth by glades and morasses, a tenth by valleys, dales, and running water, a tenth by cities, towns, and highways, a tenth by barren fields, and four-tenths by fertile fields. In this way 50,000 workmen can be fed; those mountains and hills, glades and morasses, valleys and dales, are able to provide the required material, and the cities, towns and highways are sufficient to accommodate the people concerned. This was the proportion according to which the early kings regulated the land and divided the people.
Now, the territory of Qin comprises five times a thousand square li, but the soil fit for growing corn cannot occupy more than two-fifths. The area of the fields does not come up to a million mu, and the produce and treasures of its glades and morasses, of its valleys and dales, and of its famous mountains and big rivers, are also incompletely utilized. This means that the population is illproportioned to the territory. The neighbours of Qin are the three Jin states, and of these Han and Wei are fond of employing soldiers. Their territory is narrow, but their population is numerous; their dwellings are built higgledy-piggledy, and they live close together; their grain production is small, and merchants charge interest. The people on the one hand do not have their names registered and on the other hand have no fields or houses, so that for subsistence they rely on evil occupations and pursuits of minor importance, with the result that those who are exempt from taxation because they live in steep and inaccessible places, in morasses and by streams, are more than a half of the population. Therefore, it would appear that a condition where the territory is not sufficient to support the population is still worse than that where, as in the case of Qin, the population is insufficient to fill the territory.
In reflecting upon the nature of the people, what they desire are fields and houses. Now, whereas it is probable that these are what Jin does not have, it is beyond doubt that Qin has them in surplus. If, this being so, people do not, nevertheless, come west, it is because the soldiers of Qin are in sad plight and the people suffer hardships. I venture to think that the intelligence of Your Majesty’s officials takes a mistaken view: that is, the reason why we remain weak and do not succeed in enticing the people of the three Jin states, is that we are sparing in granting titles and regard the exemption from taxes as a serious matter. They argue as follows: ’The three Jin states are weak because their people are concerned with pleasure and because exemptions and rank are treated lightly. Qin, on the other hand, is strong because its people are concerned with hard work, and exemptions and the conferment of rank are treated seriously; should we now confer many titles and grant exemptions from taxation for long periods, then we should be letting go of the principle by which Qin has become strong and should be doing exactly that which has made the Jin states weak.’ This is the argument that causes Your Majesty’s officials to regard the conferring of titles as a serious matter, and to be sparing in the granting of exemptions from taxation. I venture, however, to think that this is wrong. The object in causing the people hardship and in strengthening the army is to attack the enemy and to realize one’s desires. The "Art of War" says: "If the enemy is weak, the army is strong." This expression means that one does not fail in attack, but the enemy fails in defence. Now for four generations the Jin states have gained no victory over Qin. Since the time of King Xiang of Wei, the times that the three Jin states have been defeated by Qin, in small or big battles, in open battle or in storming defended cities, have been innumerable. The reason that in spite of this they do not submit to Qin is that Qin has been able to conquer their territory, but unable to captivate their people.
Now, if Your Majesty will issue a favourable proclamation to the effect that those soldiers of the various feudal lords who will come and submit, will be granted exemption for three generations, without hearing anything of military affairs, and that those who live within the four boundaries of Qin, in the mountains and on the slopes, on hills and in marshes, will not be called upon for ten years for military service, and if this is made clear in the law, it will be possible to create a million workers. I have said before: ’In reflecting upon the nature of the people, what they desire are fields and houses. Now, whereas it is probable that Jin does not have these, it is certain that Qin has them in surplus. If in spite of this the people do not migrate westward, it is because the soldiers of Qin are in sore plight, and the people suffer hardships.’ Now, if they are benefited with land and houses, and exemption from taxes for three generations is granted them, that is, if a point is made of giving them what they desire and of not causing them to perform what they dislike, then all the people from east of the mountains will migrate westward. Moreover, to state the case frankly: if You do not act thus, You may fill the empty and waste lands and produce natural wealth, so that a million people are engaged in the fundamental occupation, and the benefits will be manifold, but how will You prevent the soldiers from failing in their attacks?
Indeed, the trouble with Qin is, on the one hand, that if it raises soldiers and wages war, the country is poor, and on the other hand, if it remains quiet and farms, the enemy obtains respite. Your Majesty cannot combine success in these two fields. So, although for three generations it has waged successful wars, yet it has not subjected the empire. Now, if the old population of Qin are engaged in warfare, and if the newcomers are caused to occupy themselves with agriculture, then even though the army may stay a hundred days outside the frontier, within the borders not a moment will be lost for agriculture. Thus You may be successful both in enriching and in becoming strong.
When I speak of soldiers, I do not mean that all should be raised and mobilized to the last man, but according to the number of armies, soldiers, chariots and cavalry that can be furnished within the territory, cause the old population of Qin to serve as soldiers and the new people to provide fodder and food. Should there be a state in the empire that does not submit, then Your Majesty should, herewith, in spring prevent their farming, in summer live on their produce, in autumn lay hold of their harvest, and in winter pickle their vegetables: by the methods of the "Great Warfare" shake their fundamental means of existence, and by those of the "Extensive Culture" pacify their descendants. If Your Majesty follows this policy, then within ten years the various feudal lords will have no people from other countries and wherefore, then, should Your Majesty be sparing in the conferment of titles or regard exemption from taxes as a serious matter? At the victories in the Zhou and in the Hua battles, Qin extended its territory eastwards by cutting off heads, but it is clear that there was no advantage in this eastward extension; and yet officials regard these events as great accomplishments, because loss was inflicted on the enemy. Now, if the people of the three Jin states are induced to immigrate by means of grasslands and cottages, and if they are made to occupy themselves with primary things, then this way of inflicting damage on the enemy is just as real as a victory in war, and Qin will have the advantage of obtaining agricultural products. Conversely, by this plan, two birds will be hit with one stone.
Further, in the victories in the Zhou and Hua battles, or in that at Ch’ang-p’ing, how many people did Qin lose, and how many soldiers, both of the people and of the foreign inhabitants, were unable to occupy themselves with primary affairs? I venture to think that they were innumerable. Suppose amongst Your Majesty’s ministers there should be one able, with a half of these losses, to weaken Jin and to strengthen Qin as much as by the victories in these three battles, then would Your Majesty, no doubt, grant him big rewards. Now, by the method which I propose, the people would not have a single day’s scutage nor would the officials have the expense of great sums of money, while Jin would be weakened and Qin strengthened more than by three battles; but if Your Majesty still does not approve, then Your servant is too stupid to understand it.
Amongst the citizens of Qi was one Dong-guo Chang, who had very many desires and wished to have ten thousand pieces of gold. When his retainer begged for a monetary subsidy (in case he would obtain that money), he would not give it, saying: ’I want to use it to obtain a fief.’ His retainer became angry, and left him and went to Song, saying: ’This is being stingy about what he has not; therefore he is now in a worse position than when he first had me with him.’ Now Jin has the people, and Qin is sparing in the granting of exemptions from taxes; this is being stingy about what one has not, with the result that one loses what one might have. Is this not just like Dong-guo Chang’s being stingy about what he did not have, and so losing his retainer?
Moreover, in antiquity, there were Yao and Shun, who in their lifetime were praised; in the middle ages there were Tang and Wu, during whose reigns people submitted. These are the three Kings, who are praised by ten thousand generations and are regarded as sage-kings. Yet their methods cannot be applied in later times: Should You now make exemptions from taxation for three generations, You would be able completely to subject the three Jin states. This is not, like the virtuous kings, merely establishing the present times.... but effecting that later generations shall be at the service of the king! This, however, does not mean that I do not welcome a sage, but it is difficult to await a sage.